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Abstract
The U.S. nuclear posture and the future role of nuclear deterrence is a
topic that continues to be hotly debated. This situation will continue
because of changes in the international security environment and the
pressure to find reductions within the U.S. defense budget. Regardless of
claims to the contrary, nuclear deterrence remains critical in ensuring
future peace and stability.
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Introduction 
Since the use of the first atomic bombs during World War II, nuclear weapons 
have been inexorably linked with United States (U.S.) national security policy.  
Nuclear weapons are a critical part of U.S. strategies to deter would be 
aggressors.1  Additionally, the U.S. promise of extending deterrence to partners 
and allies has at times limited the proliferation of nuclear weapons, which in turn 
has promoted peace and stability in the international community.2  
 
Despite the long history of nuclear deterrence as a strategy, some policy makers 
and security experts continue to argue that the current U.S. nuclear posture is out 
of balance with today’s security threat and that nuclear deterrence is not what it 
used to be.  In a 2007 Op-Ed in the Wall Street Journal, George Shultz, William 
Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn state that a country’s reliance on nuclear 
deterrence is becoming “decreasingly effective.”3  In his April 2009 speech in 
Prague, President Obama highlighted current nuclear dangers, declaring that to 
overcome grave and growing threats, the United States will “seek the peace and 
security of a world without nuclear weapons.”4  The debate continues to unfold 
today.  Many arms control advocates believe the world would be a better place 
without nuclear arms, and even supporters of nuclear weapons lament the high 
monetary costs associated with maintaining an effective arsenal.5 The resulting 
discussions frequently focus on either reduction or all out elimination of these 
warheads. 
 
Even though the international security environment is changing and fiscal 
pressures continue to increase, nuclear deterrence remains vital to efforts aimed 
at protecting and promoting U.S. security interests around the globe.  Given 
mounting security and fiscal challenges, it is therefore appropriate to discern 
recommendations regarding the future U.S. nuclear posture and the role of 
nuclear deterrence as part of a greater U.S. national security strategy. 
 
Background and Recent Initiatives 
The current debate between nuclear arms supporters and detractors centers on 
the specifics of existing treaties and periodic posture documents, such as the 
formal Nuclear Posture Reviews, put out by the Department of Defense (DoD).   
 
 
Nuclear Posture Review 
                                                 
1 While nuclear deterrence tends to be focused towards deterring state nuclear powers, under 
certain situations, it may be possible to deter non-state actors as well.; John J.  Klein, “Deterring 
and Dissuading Nuclear Terrorism,” Journal of Strategic Security 5 (2012): 15-30, available at: 
http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol5/iss1/6. 
2 Notable exceptions include the nuclear ambitions of North Korea, Iran, and Syria.   
3 George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger and Sam Nunn, “A World Free of Nuclear 
Weapons,” The Wall Street Journal (January 4, 2007), available at: 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB116787515251566636.html. 
4 President Barack Obama, remarks given in Hradcany Square, Prague, Czech Republic (April 5, 
2009), available at: http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-By-President-
Barack-Obama-In-Prague-As-Delivered. 
5 George Perkovich et al., “Abolishing Nuclear Weapons: A Debate,” (Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace, February 13, 2009), available at: 
http://carnegieendowment.org/2009/02/13/abolishing-nuclear-weapons-debate/4b0j. 
Klein: Towards A Better U.S. Nuclear Strategy
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2014
85 
 
The most current U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), released in 2010, reaffirms 
existing strategic guidance and states that the primary role of the U.S. nuclear 
arsenal is to deter a nuclear attack on the United States, its allies, and partners.6  
The NPR describes the following five policy objectives: preventing nuclear 
proliferation and nuclear terrorism; reducing the role of U.S. nuclear weapons in 
U.S. national security strategy; maintaining strategic deterrence and stability at 
reduced nuclear force levels; strengthening regional deterrence and reassuring 
U.S. allies and partners; and sustaining a safe, secure, and effective nuclear 
arsenal.7  
 
The 2010 NPR notes that as long as nuclear weapons exist, the United States will 
seek to deter potential adversaries and assure U.S. allies and other security 
partners with a credible and comprehensive security guarantee.8  By maintaining 
a credible nuclear deterrent and reinforcing regional security architectures with 
missile defenses and other conventional military capabilities, the Obama 
administration believes it can provide confidence to its non-nuclear allies while 
also discouraging any nuclear ambitions they may entertain.  While the Obama 
administration has sought to reduce the number of warheads in the U.S. nuclear 
stockpile, its stated goal is to do so without affecting the reliability, efficacy, and 
deterrent effect of the entire arsenal.9  
 
The 2010 NPR also states that the United States must continue to maintain stable 
strategic relationships with Russia and China.  Correspondingly, the United 
States must further counter threats posed by any emerging nuclear-armed states, 
in order to protect the United States—along with its allies and partners—against 
nuclear threats or intimidation.10  The NPR underscores the importance of the 
United States’ “negative security assurance,” by declaring that Washington will 
not use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapons states 
that are party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and are in 
compliance with established non-proliferation protocols.11  This negative security 
assurance is intended to highlight the security benefits gained by adhering to and 
fully complying with the NPT, while strengthening the current non-proliferation 
regime.   
 
New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) 
Based upon the analysis conducted in support of the 2010 NPR, New START, 
signed in April 2010, limits Russia and the United States to fewer strategic 
nuclear weapons by 2018.  New START includes three main points.  It caps the 
number of deployed, long-range nuclear warheads on each side at 1,550, down 
from 2,200.  It reduces the number of deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles 
(ICBMs), deployed submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and deployed 
heavy bombers equipped for nuclear armaments to 700, with a combined limit of 
                                                 
6 The Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report (Washington, D.C.: April 2010), vii; 
“The fundamental role of U.S. nuclear weapons, which will continue as long as nuclear weapons 
exist, is to deter nuclear attack on the United States, our allies, and partners.” 
7 Ibid, iii. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Executive Office of the President, National Security Strategy (Washington, D.C.: The White 
House, May 2010), 4; “We are reducing our nuclear arsenal and reliance on nuclear weapons, while 
ensuring the reliability and effectiveness of our deterrent.” 
10 The Department of Defense, Nuclear Posture Review Report, 4. 
11 Ibid, viii. 
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800 deployed and non-deployed ICBM launchers, SLBM launchers, and heavy 
bombers equipped for nuclear armaments (the United States currently has about 
850 deployed and Russia has an estimated 565).12  It reestablishes a system in 
which both countries monitor each other’s arsenal.   
 
Under New START, the verification regime includes relevant parts of START I as 
well as new provisions to cover items not previously monitored.  Both the United 
States and Russia will continue to depend on satellite surveillance, or National 
Technical Means (NTM), to monitor the other’s strategic forces.  With respect to 
Russian mobile ICBMs, all new missiles are subject to the treaty as soon as they 
leave a production facility, and each missile and bomber will carry a unique 
identifier.  Russia must notify the United States forty-eight hours before a new 
solid-fueled ICBM or SLBM leaves its production facility and when it arrives at its 
destination, which will facilitate monitoring by NTM.  Verification of treaty limits 
and conversion or elimination of delivery systems is carried out by NTM and 
eighteen annual short-notice, on-site inspections.  The verification regime allows 
ten on-site inspections of deployed warheads and deployed and non-deployed 
delivery systems at any land, air, and submarine base.  It also allows eight on-site 
inspections at facilities that may hold only non-deployed delivery systems.13 
 
New START has been criticized for several shortcomings.  In particular, it is 
criticized for failing to address Russia’s large arsenal of short range, tactical 
nuclear weapons.  According to U.S. officials, Russia has close to a 10-to-1 
numeric advantage in this class.14  As of 2012, the United States is reported to 
have approximately 760 tactical nuclear weapons, and Russia is estimated to 
have upwards of 6,000 in its arsenal.15  During negotiations, Senators Joe Biden 
and John Kerry both expressed concern that the Bush administration's 2002 
Moscow Treaty did not limit Russian tactical nuclear forces.16  Senator Jim Risch 
tried to insert language addressing the tactical nuclear weapons issue into the 
New START treaty preamble, but was unsuccessful.17 
 
Interestingly, Washington and Moscow have reversed their respective views on 
the role of tactical nuclear weapons in military strategy.  During the Cold War, 
                                                 
12 See the U.S. Department of State New START website for an overview of the Treaty, available at 
http://www.state.gov/t/avc/newstart/index.htm. 
13 “Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the 
Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms,” Article VI, IX, X, XI, Protocol and 
Annexes, available at: http://www.state.gov/t/avc/newstart/c44126.htm. 
14 Keith Payne, “Evaluating the U.S.-Russia Nuclear Deal,” The Wall Street Journal (April 8, 2010), 
available at: 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052702303720604575169532920779888.html. 
15 Amy F.  Woolf, “Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons,” CRS Report for Congress (December 19, 2012), 
available at: http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/nuke/RL32572.pdf; The U.S. forward deploys B-61 
tactical nuclear warheads in Europe under American military custody, but they are on-hand for 
delivery by NATO or U.S. dual-capable aircraft (Ibid).  The Russians are believed to use a variety of 
tactical nuclear weapons tailored to different military units, such as rocket forces, artillery, air 
defense, frontal aviation, naval aviation, and ships and submarines.  See Gunnar Arbman and 
Charles Thornton, “Russia's Tactical Nuclear Weapons, Part I: Background and Policy Issues,” 
(Swedish Defence Research Agency, November 2003), 17, available at: 
http://drum.lib.umd.edu/bitstream/1903/7912/1/thorntonrussia.pdf. 
16 Payne, “Evaluating the U.S.-Russia Nuclear Deal.”  
17 Walter Pincus, “Russian tactical nuclear weapons still an issue after START treaty ratification,” 
The Washington Post (December 27, 2010), available at: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/12/27/AR2010122702931.html. 
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the United States and NATO initially viewed tactical nuclear weapons as crucial 
to thwart the Warsaw Pact’s overwhelming, conventional forces, an approach 
validated and required once the West abandoned any hope of countering the 
threat man-for-man or tank-for-tank.  Instead, NATO would employ tactical 
nuclear weapons along the assumed axes of Soviet advance.18  Today, Russia 
views tactical nuclear weapons as an inexpensive option and “equalizer” that 
compensates for its potential security and military shortfalls while providing for a 
defense against potential aggression by NATO, which it still views as an 
aggressive bloc.  For these reasons, Russian leaders will likely be reluctant to 
agree to any reductions in their number of tactical nuclear weapons during future 
arms control negotiations.19 
 
Calls for an Even Smaller Nuclear Force 
Despite the significant reductions in long-range arms secured in New START, 
many security and policy experts continue to advocate for even further cuts.  In 
the 2012 updated U.S. military strategy, the Secretary of Defense notes, “It is 
possible that our deterrence goals can be achieved with a smaller nuclear force, 
which would reduce the number of nuclear weapons in our inventory as well as 
their role in U.S. national security strategy.”20  It is noted, however, that no 
analysis is provided defending this view that further reductions will still produce 
the required deterrent effects.   
 
The idea of further reducing the U.S. nuclear arsenal is echoed by arms control 
groups advocating for the total elimination of all nuclear weapons.  In May 2012 
one such group—Global Zero—called for eliminating the U.S. fleet of fixed, land-
based nuclear ICBMs that make up one leg of the American nuclear triad.  It also 
advocated that all U.S. tactical nuclear weapons be eliminated over the next ten 
years, ranking their strategic utility as practically nil.21  Global Zero advocates 
include the former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General James 
Cartwright, who has stated that U.S. nuclear deterrence could be guaranteed in 
the near term with 900 nuclear warheads, and with only half deployed at a 
time.22  Cartwright goes on to state that steep reductions in the U.S. nuclear 
arsenal are needed if the United States wants to maintain credibility in urging 
restraint by other nuclear-aspirant powers such as India, Pakistan, and North 
Korea.23  
 
                                                 
18 Tom Nichols, Douglas Stuart and Jeffrey D.  McCausland (eds.), Tactical Nuclear Weapons and 
NATO (Strategic Studies Institute, April 2012), Preface, viii. 
19 Leonid Polyakov, “Aspects of the Current Russian Perspective on Tactical Nuclear Weapons,” in 
Tom Nichols, Douglas Stuart and Jeffrey D.  McCausland (eds.), Tactical Nuclear Weapons and 
NATO (Strategic Studies Institute, April 2012), 155-56. 
20 The Secretary of Defense, Sustaining U.S. Global Leadership: Priorities for 21st Century Defense 
(Washington, D.C.: January 2012), 5. 
21 Global Zero U.S. Nuclear Policy Commission, Global Zero U.S. Nuclear Policy Commission 
Report: Modernizing U.S. Nuclear Strategy, Force Structure and Posture (Global Zero, May 
2012), 7-8. 
22 Thom Shanker, “Former Commander of U.S. Nuclear Forces Call for Large Cut in Warheads,” 
The New York Times, May 15, 2012, available at: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2012/05/16/world/cartwright-key-retired-general-backs-large-us-
nuclear-reduction.html. 
23 Ibid. 
Journal of Strategic Security, Vol. 7, No. 3
https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol7/iss3/6
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.5038/1944-0472.7.3.5
88 
 
Reductions in U.S. nuclear forces are also said to be needed because of the high-
cost to maintain and upgrade the arsenal.  Such a proponent is Republican 
Senator Tom Coburn, who advocates further cuts in the U.S. nuclear arsenal to 
achieve over $79 billion in savings.24  Official DoD estimates put U.S. spending 
levels for nuclear weapons at about $214 billion over the next ten years, or just 
above $20 billion a year.25  With looming fiscal cuts to the U.S. Defense budget, 
reducing spending on efforts to upgrade and maintain the nuclear arsenal is seen 
by some as good policy.26  
 
Still, those advocating for deeper cuts in the nuclear arsenal, particularly Global 
Zero, have been criticized for shortsightedness and failing to fully understand the 
role of nuclear deterrence.  Referencing General Cartwright and the Global Zero 
nuclear policy report, General Norton Schwartz, Chief of Staff of the Air Force, is 
reported to have admonished, “I don’t agree with his assessment nor the study.”27  
Keith Payne of the National Institute of Public Policy has taken exception to the 
report’s assessment that “Security is mainly a state of mind, not a physical 
condition,” noting that states feel insecure when under a real threat or when 
physically attacked.28  Payne also counters Global Zero’s assertion that allies can 
and will be more assured by U.S. non-nuclear forces than by the “nuclear 
umbrella”29  He notes much evidence exists to the contrary because key allies—
South Korea, Japan, and members of NATO—continue to stress the importance 
of the U.S. nuclear umbrella in maintaining security assurances and promoting 
regional stability.30   
 
The Role and Limitations of Nuclear Deterrence 
When considering the future role of deterrence in U.S. national security policy, it 
is important to understand what deterrence is and what it is not.  In one of the 
most enduring definitions, deterrence is said to be “persuading a potential enemy 
that he should in his own interest avoid certain courses of activity.”31  As a subset 
of general deterrence, the concept of nuclear deterrence holds that a credible and 
potentially overwhelming use of nuclear weapons in response to an adversary’s 
attack is sufficient to deter most potential aggressors from employing nuclear 
weapons.  The most current Nuclear Posture Report underscores this idea.  It 
states: the “United States will continue to ensure that, in the calculations of any 
                                                 
24 Tom Coburn, “Back in Black," 14-15, available at: 
http://www.coburn.senate.gov/public/index.cfm?a=Files.Serve&File_id=92a11aeb-a484-45d4-
b02a-83071603accf. 
25 Gordon Adams, “Our Nukes Cost More Than You Think; Stimson Pegs Annual Nuke Spending at 
$13B,” AOL Defense (June 18, 2012), available at: http://defense.aol.com/2012/06/18/our-nukes-
cost-more-than-you-think-stimson-pegs-annual-nuke-spe/. 
26 Editor, “The Bloated Nuclear Weapons Budget,” The New York Times (October 29, 2011), 
available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/30/opinion/sunday/the-bloated-nuclear-
weapons-budget.html. 
27 Marcus Weisgerber, “USAF Chief Raps Report on Cutting Nuke Arsenal,” Defense News (May 16, 
2012), available at: 
http://www.defensenews.com/article/20120516/DEFREG02/305160009/USAF-Chief-Raps-
Report-Cutting-Nuke-Arsenal.   
28 Ibid; Keith B. Payne, “Zero Nuclear Sense: Is Reckless Disarmament the Plan for the Second 
Obama Term?” The Washington Times (May 2012), available at: 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2012/may/29/zero-nuclear-sense/. 
29 Payne, "Zero Nuclear Sense."  
30 Ibid. 
31 Schelling, Thomas, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1960), 9. 
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potential opponent, the perceived gains of attacking the United States or its allies 
and partners would be far outweighed by the unacceptable costs of the 
response.”32  To be effective, therefore, nuclear deterrence must convey to a 
potential adversary the unacceptable consequences resulting from armed attack.   
 
Yet strategist Colin S. Gray helps us begin to understand that deterrence theory 
also has its limitations.  “Given that deterrence can only work, when it does, in 
the minds of enemy leaders,” he writes, “it is their worldview, not ours, that must 
determine whether or not deterrence succeeds.”33  Therefore, it ultimately does 
not matter if U.S. national leaders, strategic planners, and defense analysts all 
agree that a potential adversary should be deterred by the U.S. nuclear posture.  
It only matters if a potential adversary’s leadership is deterred.   
 
Nuclear deterrence theory is a complex concept because at its heart lies a 
fundamental paradox.  Nuclear deterrence is only successful if it averts the use of 
nuclear weapons, but a credible deterrence capability requires planning for their 
intended use.  If employed, deterrence has failed.  In short, nuclear deterrence is 
possible only by means of maintaining an effective and credible nuclear strike 
capability as well as through efforts to implement planning necessary for its use 
against potential adversaries.   
 
The task of American nuclear strategists is complicated further because the 
concept of nuclear deterrence can be undermined in two additional and 
important ways.  First, if an offensive nuclear capability is unilaterally reduced so 
that the leadership of a potential adversary believes it can “win”—or at least “not 
lose”—a nuclear exchange, then such an arsenal cannot be considered sufficient 
and deterrence is undermined.  Second, deterrence, or more specifically extended 
deterrence, may be subverted if a leading nuclear power such as the United States 
fails to maintain a reliable and sufficiently sized arsenal capable of providing a 
nuclear guarantee to its allies.  With respect to the United States, an incredible 
security guarantee would confound the existing policy objectives of the United 
States and could encourage allies to pursue development of their own nuclear 
programs independent of U.S. stockpiles.  An increase in the number of nuclear-
armed countries would consequently exacerbate proliferation concerns and 
possibly increase the likelihood of a terrorist organization acquiring such 
weapons from one of the more nascent nuclear powers. 
 
Deterrence also works only if a credible threat of retaliatory force exists, and for 
the U.S. defense community credibility is typically governed by what is known as 
the Law of Armed Conflict, an extension of that part of international law 
regulating the conduct of armed hostilities.34  Of the ideas and principles 
contained in the Law of Armed Conflict, the two following principles are most 
germane to the idea of nuclear deterrence and any action in response to nuclear 
aggression: the principle of military necessity and that of lawful targeting.  The 
principle of military necessity calls for using only that degree and kind of force 
required for the partial or complete submission of the enemy, while taking into 
                                                 
32 The Secretary of Defense, The Nuclear Posture Review Report, xi. 
33 Gray, Colin S., National Security Dilemmas: Challenges & Opportunities (Dulles, VA: Potomac 
Books, Inc., 2009), 56. 
34 U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, 
Joint Publication 1-02 (Washington, D.C.: March, 23 1994), 215.   
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consideration the minimum expenditure of time, life, and physical resources.35 
This principle is designed to limit the application of force to that required for 
carrying out lawful military purposes.  Although the principle of military 
necessity recognizes that some collateral damage and incidental injury to civilians 
may occur when a legitimate military target is attacked, it does not excuse the 
wanton destruction of lives and property disproportionate to the military 
advantage to be gained.36  When considering the employment of nuclear 
weapons, therefore, the weapons used should not cause more destruction than 
necessary to achieve military objectives.  For example, a smaller yield nuclear 
weapon would be preferred over a larger yield warhead, if the military objectives 
can still be achieved.   
 
In contrast, the principle of lawful targeting is based on three underpinnings.37 
First, it stipulates that a belligerent’s right to injure the enemy is not unlimited.  
Second, it states that the launching of attacks specifically against civilian 
populations is prohibited.  And third, it posits that the identification and 
distinction of combatants must be made clear so as to spare as much as possible 
any injury to non-combatants.  Consequently, and by extension, the principle of 
lawful targeting requires that all “reasonable precautions” must be taken to 
ensure the targeting of only military objectives, so that damage to civilian objects 
(collateral damage) or death and injury to civilians (incidental injury) is avoided 
as much as possible.38  Such considerations are fundamentally important to all 
U.S. nuclear force posture decisions because an excessively large nuclear weapon 
could more difficult to successful employ against a smaller, more localized target 
where non-combatants are located nearby. 
 
Arms control has a critical place in U.S. national security strategy, and calls to 
further reduce to the number of warheads in the nuclear arsenal should be 
discussed and debated by both policy makers and strategists.  It is noted, 
however, that frequently those proponents advocating the most significant 
reductions from current nuclear warhead levels do so without any analytical 
justification.  Commonly, those seeking dramatic reductions simply state that the 
international environment has changed since the end of the Cold War, and 
therefore, nuclear weapons are now useless against most of today’s greatest 
threats.39  This argument is merely a supposition that because the world has 
changed, the role of nuclear deterrence is no longer valid.  It is also a nonanalytic 
argument when simply stating that United States has more than enough nuclear 
weapons to deter any nation and can retain that deterrent while eliminating 
excess weapons.  When debating the size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal, the final 
decision should be based upon sound analytics and not on conjecture or wishful 
thinking.   
 
 
Recommendations for the Future 
                                                 
35 U.S. Department of the Navy, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, 
NWP 1-14M (Washington, D.C.: July 9, 1995), 6-5.   
36 Ibid; This concept is also referred to as the principle of proportionality.   
37 Ibid, 8-1; This also referred to as the principle of distinction. 
38 Ibid.   
39 Global Zero U.S. Nuclear Policy Commission, Global Zero U.S. Nuclear Policy Commission 
Report, 1-2. 
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There are several kinds of assessments and analytical techniques that could be 
used to suggest the “correct” number of warheads so that the U.S. can “ensure” 
deterrence, and these techniques are dependent on the informed preconceptions 
of perceived threats.  While providing specifics on the type and number of 
nuclear weapons needed to ensure deterrence implies a finite degree of certitude 
about the accuracy of any forthcoming analysis, more often than not, such 
analysis is simply a best—though educated—guess about the potential threat.  In 
other words, it is based on assumptions about the strength and extent of 
competing arsenals, as well as assumptions about the risk tolerance of those 
holding leadership positions in the governments of potential adversaries.  Once 
made, furthermore, such assumptions almost certainly would become outdated 
within a relatively short amount of time.  In the aggregate, such uncertainties 
associated with the assumptions used to assess a potential adversary’s capability 
and motivation may help explain why the U.S. defense establishment has 
consistently displayed an inability to accurately assess the capabilities of 
potential adversaries and for predicting future threats.40  Despite the level of 
uncertainty embedded in such strategic efforts related to calculating the required 
number of nuclear weapons, it remains possible to provide specific 
recommendations concerning the future U.S. nuclear posture and the role of 
nuclear deterrence in addressing future global security challenges.  These 
recommendations are as follows.   
 
Don’t Seek the Minimum Number of Weapons  
Policymakers should not seek to reduce the U.S. nuclear arsenal to the minimum 
required to achieve deterrence.  This is because any determined minimum 
threshold could be based upon erroneous information or the threat assessment 
could change after such a determination is made.  Among some analysts, there is 
frequently a tendency to determine through some chosen process the minimum 
number of nuclear warheads that the United States should maintain to ensure 
effective deterrence, while still meeting our extended deterrence obligations with 
allies and partners.  For example, Global Zero’s Nuclear Policy Commission has 
advocated for a “substantially decreased stockpile of nuclear weapons and 
delivery vehicles” resulting in only 450 immediately deployable warheads.41  This 
number is dramatically lower than current levels and would cause extensive 
changes in current U.S. contingency plans and military agreements.  Such 
reductions could in themselves result in additional security risks and unintended 
consequences. 
 
Seeking a minimum threshold is a dangerous strategy.  If U.S. national security 
leadership decided to only have a nuclear arsenal that was on par or comparable 
to that of a potential adversary, then deterrence would be limited.  As Henry 
Kissinger and Brent Scowcroft have astutely noted, “Strategic stability is not 
inherent [in a strategic posture] with low numbers of weapons; indeed, 
excessively low numbers could lead to a situation in which surprise attacks are 
conceivable.”42  Therefore, a potential adversary, based upon its own 
                                                 
40 Richard Danzig, Driving in the Dark: Ten Propositions About Prediction and National Security 
(Washington, D.C.: Center for a New American Century, October 2011), 5. 
41 Global Zero U.S. Nuclear Policy Commission, Global Zero U.S. Nuclear Policy Commission 
Report, 6-7. 
42 Henry A.  Kissinger and Brent Scowcroft, “Strategic Stability in Today’s Nuclear World,” The 
Washington Post, April 23, 2012. 
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assessments, could determine it could actually “win” or even achieve a stalemate 
during a nuclear exchange with the United States.  So, reductions that set an 
arbitrary bottom threshold on nuclear capability might increase the likelihood of 
deterrence failing.  This is because the lower the threshold, the greater the chance 
for ambiguity or uncertainty about the U.S. nuclear capability, which could cause 
an adversary to seek conflict.   
 
Maintain a Range of Nuclear Response Options 
In order to have a credible nuclear deterrent—one that is able to deter a range of 
potential future threats—the United States must have a variety of nuclear 
weapons that are able to deliver both minor and severe military effect 
commensurate with the anticipated threat.  Specifically, the U.S. nuclear arsenal 
should include an ample number of low-yield nuclear weapons, so that the 
president is provided with the best range of potential response options following 
an adversary’s attack.  According to the Law of Armed Conflict, the application of 
the principle of military necessity to any potential U.S. nuclear response 
following an act of aggression means that the response should not exceed the 
kind or degree of force needed to accomplish the military objective.43  
Additionally, applying the principle of lawful targeting means that a nuclear 
response should discriminate between military objectives and civilian objects to 
mitigate collateral damage and incidental injury.44  For these reasons, smaller 
low-yield weapons may prove to be the preferred nuclear response option vice 
larger and potentially more indiscriminate nuclear warheads. 
 
If an adversary detonated a low-yield nuclear weapon within the United States 
and a commensurate low-yield nuclear weapon was not readily available for a 
U.S. response to the attack, U.S. national leadership would need to weigh other 
options, such as employing a higher-yield nuclear weapon or conventional 
weapons with a similar destructive effect.  Both options pose challenges for 
policymakers.  Using a significantly higher yield nuclear weapon might greatly 
increase the possibility of conflict escalation, which may not be in the best 
interests of the United States.  The employment of a higher-yield nuclear 
response option might also exceed the degree of force needed to accomplish the 
military objective and could, therefore, violate the Law of Armed Conflict.  As for 
planning for and relying on a conventional response to a nuclear strike, U.S. 
policymakers would be required to consider how this might undermine allied 
perceptions of Washington’s resolve, commitment to the idea of extended 
deterrence, and the credibility of the American nuclear arsenal.   
 
Maintaining a range of U.S. nuclear options also means providing for a variety of 
delivery vehicles such as those provided in the current triad system with launch 
capabilities across the air, sea, and land environs.  This goes against Global Zero 
proposals to eliminate all fixed, land-based inter-continental ballistic missiles 
(ICBMs), in part because of perceived risks associated with this leg of the nuclear 
triad.  The argument of Global Zero advocates is based on assertions that the 
existence of ICBMs can produce ambiguous attack indications in the minds of 
                                                 
43 U.S. Department of the Navy, The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, 6-
5. 
44 Ibid, 8-1. 
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potential adversaries and might trigger unnecessary nuclear retaliation.45  Also, 
the fixed locations of ICBM launch sites are said to be inherently targetable and 
depend heavily on launch warning for survival.46  Admittedly, fixed ICBM sites 
are indeed targetable and their projected overflight paths might introduce a level 
of anxiety in some nations.  But such anxiety can be addressed through greater 
diplomatic coordination with affected nations, and their inherent vulnerability 
can be mitigated through advanced methods of indications and warning and anti-
missile defenses.  Submarine or aircraft that launch nuclear weapons are also 
targetable and vulnerable, albeit less so.  Yet their existence in the nuclear triad 
system improves the survivability of the entire arsenal vis-à-vis the concept of 
dispersal, an effective approach for complicating the targeting calculations of 
potential adversaries. 
 
Address Russia’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons 
Tactical nuclear weapons were not addressed in New START, specifically Russia’s 
substantial inventory of these shorter-range nuclear weapons.  This was a 
mistake.  Even though Moscow views tactical nuclear weapons as critical to their 
strategic defense, these weapons should be open to discussion, primarily because 
the differentiation between “strategic” and “tactical” nuclear weapons is no 
longer as important as in days past.  The distinction may have had significant 
prior merit, but the technological and geopolitical developments that have 
occurred over the past several decades suggest the need for a new approach.  
Colin Gray has correctly observed that military activity is inherently tactical, but 
also points out that the consequence of all military activity is the realm of 
strategy.47  This holds true regarding nuclear weapons.  The use of nuclear 
weapons to achieve military objectives is tactical in nature, but the consequences 
or effects of their use should and must be considered strategic. 
 
Consequently, future language in a new treaty with Russia or any other country 
should address all classes and types of nuclear weapons, including shorter-range 
or “tactical” nuclear weapons.48  Nuclear deterrence concerns all types and sizes 
of nuclear weapons and delivery systems.  Arms control efforts to limit the future 
nuclear arsenals should therefore address the full spectrum of a country’s nuclear 
capability.   
 
Conclusion 
It is likely that the role and size of the U.S. nuclear arsenal will continue to be 
debated because of the advocacy of arms control groups and the ongoing pressure 
to find savings within the U.S. defense budget.  This advocacy and fiscal pressure 
may indeed lead to further reductions in the nuclear arsenal or to additional 
delays in efforts to modernize and maintain the arsenal.  Any reduction in the 
number of nuclear warheads should be made with a serious consideration of the 
                                                 
45 Global Zero U.S. Nuclear Policy Commission, Global Zero U.S. Nuclear Policy Commission 
Report, 7. 
46 Ibid, 8. 
47 Gray, Colin S., Modern Strategy (London: Oxford University Press, 1999), 18.   
48 Such an agreement may be seen as inconsequential to China, whose arsenal is not assessed to 
include any tactical or low-yield nukes; see Office of the Secretary of Defense, "Military and Security 
Developments Involving the People's Republic of China" (Washington, D.C.: August 2011): 34, 
available at: http://www.defense.gov/pubs/pdfs/2011_CMPR_Final.pdf. 
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risks posed by such reductions.  Regardless of the outcome of such reduction 
discussions, a better understanding of the role of nuclear deterrence—and 
extended deterrence—and the implications of the Law of Armed Conflict regime, 
would allow for a more careful discernment of preferred actions regarding the 
future U.S. nuclear strategy, posture, and the proper employment of American 
nuclear arms.   
 
A more careful assessment of and approach to the use of American nuclear 
weapons must: avoid undue reductions in the size of the overall arsenal; maintain 
a range of nuclear response options, to include a capacity for responding with 
small-yield nuclear devices and those delivered via ICBMs or SLBMs; and insist 
on the inclusion of Russian tactical nuclear weapons during future treaty 
negotiations.   
 
Maintaining effective deterrence and ensuring future non-use of nuclear arms is 
an expensive proposition, but the alternative of deterrence failing and a state-to-
state nuclear exchange is many times more costly and severe.  The maintenance 
of a nuclear capacity is necessary to ensure a strong deterrent capability and to 
provide an extended guarantee of security to American allies.  Such a plan will 
require a substantial but necessary investment.  A failure to provide for adequate 
financial resources now may prove to be both costly and devastating in the future.  
It would be wise to provide adequate investments now to reduce such risk.   
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